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Debt, Theft, Permaculture  
Justice and Ecological Scale  
  
Gerry Canavan  
  
If, as Fredric Jameson once wrote, it has become easier to imagine 
“the thoroughgoing deterioration of the Earth and of nature” than the 
end of capitalism, this is in part because we are increasingly aware 
that the two phrases describe in fact the same event.1 But the 
imagined extinction of alternatives to capitalism associated with 
Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” that so concerns Jameson carries 
with it a type of ideological shadow: if capitalism is, as K. William Kapp 
once put it, “an economy of unpaid costs,” then our increasing 
recognition that the bill is finally coming due must be recognized as a 
kind of nascent revolutionary consciousness.2 Bruno Latour, who in his 
most well-known book famously declared, “We have never been 
modern,” recently wrote that “It has now almost become common 
sense that we were able to think we were modern only as long as the 
various ecological crises could be denied or delayed.”3  
  Though Latour and I part ways on many questions about 
ecology, on this he is surely correct: we cannot believe anymore that 
we are modern, that is, we cannot believe anymore that we have 
made some final break with the material realities of soil, air, and water 
that sustain us and on which everything depends. This essay seeks to 
make a preliminary accounting of the circuits of dependence that 
characterize capitalism’s relationship with the environment through the 
assertion of an ecological debt that has long been in arrears, though 
the bearers of this mortgage may be distant in both space and time.  
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The Second Contradiction of Capitalism                                          
When approaching ecology as the “second contradiction” of 
capitalism, commenters often begin with a passage on soil ecology 
from Capital, volume. 1, chapter 15: “All progress in capitalistic 
agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the labourer, 
but of robbing the soil; all progress in increasing the fertility of the soil 
for a given time is a progress towards ruining the lasting sources of 
that fertility.”4 John Bellamy Foster has traced Marx’s interest in (and 
horror at) this “metabolic rift” to its origins in the work of Justus von 
Liebig, whose recognition of the breakdown in the cycle of soil 
replenishment led to the development of a process to replenish fields 
artificially through the use of chemical fertilizers—which led to a 
colonial project of importing guano and other materials from places as 
far off as Peru and the South Pacific, and which itself ultimately leads 
to an unbalancing of the nitrogen cycle and further ecological 
degradation of soil, water, and the climate.5 Nature magazine recently 
published an article identifying the nitrogen cycle as one of three 
ecological boundaries whose crisis thresholds we have already far 
overshot; with 35 million annual tons projected as the “safe” annual 
limit, we currently convert over 120 million tons of nitrogen per year.6 
Scientific management of the soil has, in this way, only made the 
problem worse.   
In the soil cycle we find a first mode for imagining ecological 
debt. Here we have ecological debt at a kind of zero-level: when you 
grow food and ship that food far away—when, that is, you strip 
necessary minerals from the soil and ship them out of the local 
ecosystem—you destroy the long-term sustainability of your own 
agricultural practices. In a sense here the “debt” is owed to oneself, or 
at least 3 to one’s local area and immediate descendants, and because 
of the local temporal and spatial scales involved it is a debt whose 
repayment manifests as a relatively urgent concern. The agricultural 
capitalist is motivated to embark on some sort of rational management 
of the soil if only to protect his own assets, even if his management is 
always fitful and incomplete, and in awkward balance with the pursuit 
of profit.  
The more fraught cases are those in which the consequences of 
the ecological debt rebound, not on you, or even on your descendants, 
but on other people living in distant spaces and times. This is the 
power plant whose emissions blow across a mountain range into some 
another nation, or the factory whose toxic dumping floats downstream 
into someone else’s water basin, or the civilization that uses up the 
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entire  fossil fuel reserve of the planet in a single hundred-year spree. 
If, in the case of the soil, the agricultural capitalist cuts his own throat, 
we are now on more familiar ground, with the capitalist returning to 
his usual practice of cutting someone else’s. It was this phenomenon 
that K. William Kapp abstracted in 1950 in The Social Costs of Private 
Enterprise as a general law of capitalism: “Capitalism must be 
regarded as an economy of unpaid costs, ‘unpaid’ in so far as a 
substantial portion of the actual costs of production remain 
unaccounted for in entrepreneurial outlays; instead they are shifted to, 
and ultimately borne by, third persons or by the community as a 
whole.”7 We find therefore that both “contradictions” of capital—both 
labor and ecology—are in this way predicated on the existence of 
structural debts, “unpaid costs,” that in the case of ecology at least are 
becoming unavoidably and often painfully visible to us. This suggests 
an oppositional strategy of actualizing these unacknowledged debts, 
making an accounting of them in the demand that they be recognized 
and paid back.  
The metaphorical assertion of a debt where none is admitted is 
therefore first and foremost a political act of anticapitalist resistance; it 
is an assertion that historical relations of domination and exploitation 
have ongoing consequences in the present, a demand that reparation 
or remuneration is possible and that therefore it is necessary. Our 
Common Agenda, a report published by Latin American and Caribbean 
intellectuals in the run-up to the 1992 Earth Summit states the point 
directly: “The industrial revolution was based in large part on the 
exploitation of natural resources in ways which did not reflect their 
true costs. . . . The industrialized countries have incurred an ecological 
debt with the world.”8   
As Joan Martinez-Alier notes in her essay “Environmental Justice (Local 
and Global),” it is better to think of these sorts of “ecological debts” as 
incursive, or if you like imperial, rather than purely extractive: “In [the 
case of carbon emissions], Europeans act as if we owned a sizable 
chunk of the planet outside Europe; . . . the occupation of an 
environmental space larger than one’s own territory gives rise to an 
ecological debt with spatial and temporal dimensions.”9 Now, to be 
sure, there are myriad cases of extractive ecological debt; one thinks, 
for instance, of the tiny island nation of Nauru in the South Pacific, 
whose interior was almost completely strip-mined for phosphates for 
use as agricultural fertilizer over the course of the twentieth century 
and now looks more or less like the surface of the moon, and is just as 
dead. This once self-sustaining island paradise, a place formerly known 
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as “Pleasant Island,” now subsists on the importation of necessities 
paid for through a rapidly depleting trust established during the years 
of the phosphorus boom, international money laundering, sales of 
passports to noncitizens with few questions asked, and sporadic 
foreign aid.10   
So there is certainly extractive debt—but the more general form of 
ecological debt is not extractive but incursive. Ecological debt arises 
when the “unpaid costs” of capitalism in the developed nations are 
borne by inhabitants of the underdeveloped ones. In this sense the 
notion of an outsized global footprint is closely related to postcolonial 
studies of empire. The concept of ecological debt first arose out of 
Latin American political thought in the 1990s as a kind of special case 
of postcolonial reparations. Writing in 1994, José María Borrero Navia, 
one of the early popularizers of the concept, noted that ecological debt 
is not some abstract obligation to the biosphere as such but an 
obligation to “humanity, acquired by reason of often irreversible 
damages to the biophysical base of societies provoked by the islands 
of privilege, wasteful economics and industries of barbarity, the 
consequences of which have been the impoverishment and exclusion 
of hundreds of millions of people, ethnocide, and subjugation of 
cultures.”11 Ecological debt is owed not to the planet but to other 
persons: persons who were not volitional participants in this exchange 
in the first place, who never signed any sort of contract but whom we 
must conclude are owed a moral and legal debt for what has been 
done without their consent to the places where they live.  
”Our Future Is Not for Sale”: Climate Debt  
Another arresting example of the imperial,  extraspatial debt 
incurred by the negative consequences cascading out of agricultural 
production is found in the   forty-thousand-square-kilometer “dead 
zone” in the Black Sea brought about by fertilizer overuse in the 
communist bloc over three decades, starting in the 1960s. The region 
has begun a long and slow recovery since the fall of the Soviet Union 
in 1991, but this recovery is now threatened by the entry of the 
Danube basin into the European Union, whose Western European 
industrial agriculturalists are looking to buy cheap farmland and begin 
the cycle of fertilizer overuse and soil/water degradation all over 
again.12 We might think as well of the recent Deepwater Horizon crisis 
in the Gulf of Mexico, where a massive spill in an offshore oil rig owned 
by British Petroleum reached proportions that far exceed the Exxon 
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Valdez and will affect the ecology of the entire region negatively for 
years to come.  
But the most strikingly exemplary case for this more abstract 
mode of “imperial” ecological debt might be the archipelago nation of 
Tuvalu, population twelve thousand, whose remoteness and lack of 
extractable natural resources have led to a largely bloodless colonial 
relationship with the imperial powers of Europe and North America. 
Tuvalu rose to prominence during the climate negotiations in 
Copenhagen in 2009 because it will be one of the first nations to face 
the devastating consequences of climate change. For a nation whose 
highest point is merely 4.5 meters above sea level, the effects of rising 
waters will be immediate and catastrophic. The existential threat to 
Tuvalu has lent it moral weight as the leader of the group of 
developing nations demanding immediate sweeping action, including a 
legally binding accord that would stabilize carbon at 350 ppm. These 
nations insist on measures that would limit the rise in global 
temperatures rise to 1.5 °C, demand wide-ranging financial payments 
from developed nations, and oppose carbon exceptions for 
fastergrowing developing nations like India, China, and Brazil.13 Ian 
Fry, Tuvalu’s delegate at Copenhagen, told those gathered that for 
these nations, the “future rests on the outcome of this meeting.” When 
the meeting ended with none of its demands having been met, Fry 
concluded, “It looks like we are being offered 30 pieces of silver to 
betray our people and our future. . . . Our future is not for sale. I 
regret to inform you that Tuvalu cannot accept this document.”14  
Unfortunately, Tuvalu may not have a future at all. According to 
James Lewis’s paper “Sea-Level Rise: Some Implications for Tuvalu,” 
published in 1989 by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, a 20 to 
40 cm rise in sea level by the end of the century will leave much of 
Tuvalu flooded, and much or all of the population will likely need to be 
evacuated.15 The early date of this paper should serve as a reminder 
that the climate change crisis has been widely recognized for over two 
decades, which have since passed without any significant action on the 
part of the industrialized states that produce most of the world’s 
greenhouse gases. Moreover, if these estimates of sea level rise are 
found to be too conservative, naturally the situation will only be worse.  
Tuvalu’s relationship to global ecological crisis exemplifies “ecological 
debt” in its most immediate and urgent form: the relationship of a 
southern people facing deprivation, displacement, or outright 
elimination of their way of life as a consequence of the actions of the 
industrialized North. In what Naomi Klein has memorably called a 
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“cruel geographical irony,” the chief economist at the World Bank has 
estimated that “about 75 to 80 percent” of the damage caused by 
climate change “will be suffered by developing countries, although 
they only contribute about one-third of greenhouse gases”— and even 
that “one-third” suggests a presentist perspective that obliterates all 
but the most recent history of emissions.16 The true number is closer 
to 20 percent of the population of the planet having emitted 75 
percent of the total historical greenhouse gas emission, with the 
United States (5 percent global population) emitting approximately 25 
percent just on its own.17 Haiti, in contrast, emits just 1 percent of 
total global carbon emissions, but according to the Maplecroft Climate 
Change Vulnerability Index it is the world’s second-most endangered 
nation  because of  climate change, behind only Somalia.18  
In contrast to the usual political assertions of climate 
emergency—that we are “one planet” on a “pale blue dot,” all in this 
together, facing a shared crisis that threatens us all universally— 
climate debt stakes its claim by insisting on particularity and 
difference.19 Climate change, the argument goes, is not at all some 
“natural disaster”; it is not something that “just happened” like an 
asteroid from space; it is something the Global North has inflicted on 
everybody else, with the worst consequences having ramifications on 
those nations in the Global South that did not contribute to the crisis 
and  that are worst positioned to adapt. Klein highlights the work of 
Bolivia’s chief climate negotiator, Angelica Navarro, who has said, 
“Millions of people—in small islands, least-developed countries, 
landlocked countries as well as vulnerable communities in Brazil, India 
and China, and all around the world—are suffering from the effects of 
a problem to which they did not contribute.” In Bolivia itself, the two 
largest cities face severe water shortages as a result of nearby glaciers 
melting from rising temperatures.20  
As a policy measure, Klein writes, ecological debt (her version focuses 
specifically on climate debt because it can be so easily quantified) 
demands three basic categories of behavior:          
 1.) Developed nations must recognize that they have a legal 
obligation to pay the costs for nations in the Global South to 
ameliorate the effects of climate change. In US legal parlance, this is 
the simple principle that the “polluter pays.” That these are 
reparations, and not charity, additional loans, or neoliberal strategies 
for so-called “development” that will only worsen the problem, is 
key.21 Klein quotes two activists who speak to the pressing need for a 
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recognition of climate debt. “Climate debt is not a matter of charity,” 
says Lidy Nacpil, a coordinator for Jubilee South. “What we need is not 
something we should be begging for but something that is owed to us, 
because we are dealing with a crisis not of our making.” An advocate 
for Maasai tribespeople in Kenya, Sharon Looremeta, gives a more 
stark appraisal: “The Maasai community does not drive 4x4s or fly off 
on holidays in airplanes. . . . We have not caused climate change, yet 
we are the ones suffering. This is an injustice and should be stopped 
right now.”22  
2). Developed nations must pay the cost to “leapfrog” developing 
nations past the dirty carbon stage of modernization towards cleaner, 
more sustainable technologies. The developing world cannot be 
expected to sacrifice its chances at industrial development because the 
United States and Europe have already used up the planet’s entire 
carbon capacity for themselves. “We cannot and will not give up our 
rightful claim to a fair share of atmospheric space on the promise that, 
at some future stage, technology will be provided to us,” Navarro has 
said.23  
3) To the extent that carbon emissions remain necessary for 
development, developed nations must bear the vast majority of carbon 
emissions cuts, bringing their carbon emissions below even the 
percentage of the planetary population they represent in order to 
“make atmospheric space available” for the undeveloped and 
developing nations that have not yet used their allotment, and for 
whom emissions mean things like rural electrification rather than 
surplus bourgeois comforts.24  
The United States’ head climate negotiator, Todd Stern, has 
rejected any call for reparations as “wildly unrealistic” and “untethered 
to reality,”;25  he dismissively told a news conference: “I actually 
completely reject the notion of a debt or reparations or anything of the 
like. . . . For most of the 200 years since the Industrial Revolution, 
people were blissfully ignorant of the fact that emissions caused a 
greenhouse effect. It’s a relatively recent phenomenon.”26 But when 
Stern was senior US negotiator at the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in 
1997, nearly ten years had already passed after NASA’s James Hansen 
testified to Congress in 1988 about the imminent dangers posed by 
global climate change. Hansen’s findings were the result of wide 
scientific consensus about global warming in the mid-1970s, which 
were based on climate models about global warming developed in the 
1950s, over half a century after the concept was first proposed by 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.  
Debt: Ethics, the Environment, and the Economy (2013): pg. 210-224. Permalink. This article is © Indiana University Press 
and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Indiana University Press does 
not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission 
from Indiana University Press. 
8  
  
Svante Arrhenius in 1896. However one chooses to narrate that 
history, to suggest that the North has somehow been blindsided by all 
this sudden interest in carbon and the climate is baldly disingenuous.  
  
  
Suing the Present: Climate Trials  
The question of precisely who the debtors and who the creditors 
are when it comes to climate debt is a fraught one. José María Borrerro 
Navia points to four categories of debtors:  
1. Transnational corporations, whose power lies in creating a 
system of subjugation.  
2. Transnational banks that play an unquestionable role in the 
promotion of ecological disasters in the name of development.  
3. Northern governmental bureaucracies, self-affirmed as the 
hegemonic power, especially since the collapse of Eastern socialist 
bureaucracies.  
4. Southern bureaucrats and elites who have engineered, directly 
or indirectly, ecological destruction processes in their countries.27  
Left off the hook? Those everyday consumers in the industrialized 
countries fingered by Kenya’s Sharon Looremeta, who “drive 4x4s or 
fly off on holidays in airplanes.” But perhaps this is not so obscene as 
it might first appear. John Bellamy Foster and Brett Clark have argued 
that the ecologically destructive patterns of consumption on the part of 
everyday westerners should be thought of as a kind of cognitive 
“consumer trap.” These consumers,   they maintains, are constrained 
by choices that have already been made at the level of production by 
the transnational corporate elite. Thus, any personal consumer 
“choice” is already determined by a system marked by deterioration 
and waste, a framework on which the individual consumer has 
essentially no leverage. He or she moreover will often lack the 
knowledge necessary to make a truly informed choice in the first 
place.28 It was Marx himself, after all, who argued in the first chapter 
of the first volume of  Capital that we can know the  true workings of 
the system  only by working at the level of production, not 
consumption.  
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And even those self-same corporate overloads are in some sense 
“blameless” in the sense that it is the system itself—the production 
treadmill of capitalism—that inevitably accelerates environmental 
damage and degeneration. We should not be surprised that so little 
has been done. What drives the “thoroughgoing deterioration of the 
Earth and of the nature” is the logic of capitalism itself, a mode of 
production  that both insists (culturally) and depends (structurally) on 
limitless expansion and permanent growth: into new markets, into the 
former colonial periphery, into the peasant countryside, through oil 
derricks into the deepest crevices of the  earth, through carbon 
emissions and ozone degradation into the upper atmosphere, and 
finally via rocket to Earth orbit—and, then, in its most cherished 
futurological imaginings, to orbital space stations, lunar cities, Martian 
settlements, asteroid belt mining colonies, sleeper ships to Alpha 
Centauri, and on and on. It is capitalism itself that is subject to the 
two-century-old Jevons paradox, the sociological law which 
demonstrates that improvements in energy efficiency do not 
correspond with reductions in consumption; innovations that consume 
half the fuel will simply be used twice as much.29 “Capitalism,” Foster 
writes in his ecological history of capitalism, The Vulnerable Planet, 
“cannot exist without constantly expanding the realm of production:  
Any interruption in this process will take the form of economic crisis.”30  
This is why the market solutions proposed by Lord Nicholas  
Stern in the Stern Report are rightly rejected by Vandana Shiva in Soil, 
Not Oil as mere eco-imperialism that “allows corporations to gain 
increasing control of the earth’s resources—energy, water, air, land, 
and biodiversity—to continue to run the industrialized globalized 
economy.”31 She highlights the absurdity of a pollution reduction 
strategy in which “carbon credits” are given to historical polluters to 
financialize as profit: “Nonpolluting, nonindustrial activity does not 
even figure in Kyoto’s CDM [Clean Development Mechanisms]. To be 
counted as clean, you must first be dirty.”32  
Neoliberal market solutions are especially perverse as they arise in the 
precise moment that multiple ecological crises inescapably 
demonstrate the impossibility of market stewardship of the 
environment. Market logics such as cap and trade will always reduce to 
the logic of Larry Summers’s infamous memo to senior World Bank 
staff arguing that “the World Bank should be encouraging more 
migration of the dirty industries to the LDC [Less Developed 
Countries]” on the grounds that the lowest-wage earning nations will 
necessary have the lowest costs associated with the illness and death 
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of pollution their mortality rate is already high anyway such countries 
are “vastly under-polluted” compared to, say, Mexico City and Los  
Angeles, with their elevated smog levels.33  
 Summers has since claimed the memo was satire, but whatever 
the intended tone, the memo reflects a certain truth about the slippery 
operation of “efficiency” as it operates with regard to environmental 
economics. As Brazil’s former secretary of the environment José 
Lutzenburger fired back: “Your reasoning is perfectly logical but totally 
insane. . . . Your thoughts [provide] a concrete example of the 
unbelievable alienation, reductionist thinking, social ruthlessness and 
the arrogant ignorance of many conventional ‘economists’ concerning 
the nature of the world we live in.”34  
Blissful inaction and deliberate malfeasance on the part of elites 
in the developed world has been so stark, in fact, that for some, 
including James Hansen, the operative term is not climate debt so 
much as climate trials. Hansen, who was arrested at a mountaintop 
removal coal protest against the now- infamous Massey Energy 
Corporation in 2009, the same firm whose Upper Big Branch coal mine 
collapsed in West Virginia in early 2010 after receiving thousands of 
dollars in fines from mine safety citations, has called for CEOs of major 
energy corporations to be tried for “crimes against humanity.”35 
Others, like Jamais Cascio, founder of worldchanging.org,   have 
speculated on the near-future “tobaccoification” of carbon, in reference 
to industry-funded denialism in the face of established scientific 
consensus.36 Still others would name the Bush, Blair, and Harper 
administrations, for starters, as codefendants.  
Science fiction writer Bruce Sterling, while generally skeptical of 
the potential for climate trials to put us on the road to a more rational 
climate policy, does not doubt their symbolic value. He memorably 
wrote in one of his annual “State of the World” reports that “polluting 
the entire sky is the biggest market failure in the history of the human 
race, when the Hamptons and Malibu start goingunder water, really 
rich and powerful people are gonna get mad and vengeful.”37 The 
recognition of the moral demand made by ecological debt provides a 
framework to harness the righteous anger of the rich and the poor 
alike, providing strategies for resistance to business as usual: forging 
political alliances, mass protest movements, divestment campaigns, 
civil disobedience, and other strategies for social mobilization. Naomi 
Klein highlights the way indigenous groups in Canada have attempted 
to leverage the nation’s unpaid obligations to First Nation peoples 
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against its WTO status and its Standard & Poor bond rating, essentially 
arguing that Canada keeps vast “unfunded liabilities” off its books. The 
same  judolike reversal of market logic might be made against 
transnational corporations and industrialized nations of the Global 
North alike. In 2008, in an astonishing act of jury nullification in the 
United Kingdom, six anticoal activists were cleared of criminal liability 
of  thirty-five thousand euros of damage on the grounds that they had 
a “lawful excuse” to prevent the coal plant’s functioning in order to 
prevent damage to the environment.38 That same year, a stunt 
classaction lawsuit was filed by an activist in the International Criminal 
Court asking for “$1 billion dollars in damages on behalf of future 
generations of human beings on Earth—if there are any.”39  
The Future in the Present: Permaculture  
Of course some number of human beings will likely survive even the 
worst projections of ecological catastrophe—but if we continue to let 
capitalism blithely take its course, those who do survive will live lives 
dramatically worse than the ones they might otherwise have, had we 
acted. Alongside the obligation to already existing humans is the 
obligation to the ones who will exist, whose inheritance we are 
squandering—which is an obligation to humanity as such. Without 
disputing the urgency of climate debt’s call to defend both bio- and 
cultural diversity in the here and now, at the same time we must 
recognize, dialectically, the urgency of its call to a shared futurity; the 
recognition of ecological debt compels us to recognize a planetary 
commons extending in both space and time, from which global 
capitalism has ceaselessly appropriated more than its fair share.  In 
his contribution to Red Planets: Marxism and Science Fiction, cultural 
critic Carl Freedman identifies a central disjuncture in Marxist thought 
between the deflationary and inflationary modes of critique. “The 
deflationary dimension,” he writes, “is represented by the attempt to 
destroy all illusions necessary or useful to the preservation of class 
society in general and of capitalism in particular” —this can be seen 
fairly clearly in ideology critique but also in the more specifically 
structural discussion of the “secret” of surplus-value in Capital.40 This, 
Freedman suggests, has a certain figurative relationship with noir in 
prose and film.41 While noir does not produce usable knowledge about 
the workings of capital, the genre’s preoccupation with individual 
greed “allegorically gestures towards . . . the kind of knowledge 
discoverable through application of Marx’s principle of the ultimately 
determining role of the economy.”42 It produces a kind of affective 
intuition that points us in the right direction, so to speak, if not getting 
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us much of the way there Deflation is an economic mode, a scientific 
mode, and something of a cold mode—it is the mode that drives 
Marx’s many formulae. Inflation, in contrast, is much more 
fragmentary and affective than deflation. It is effusive and intangible, 
a mode of prophecy and dreams. Marx, after all, had famously little to 
say about what the world would be like under communism, but the 
utopian impulse towards a liberatory fulfillment of history—Marx calls it 
history’s true beginning, Engels called it “humanity’s leap from the 
kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom”—is nonetheless 
always the beating heart at the center of the Marxist project.43 For 
Freedman, the genre most closely associated with this utopian impulse 
is science fiction, and he goes on to argue that, unlike noir, science 
fiction narratives can provide better pictures of the inflationary future 
than straight expository prose; because it is impossible to produce 
concrete knowledge of the future in the same way we can produce it of 
the present and the past, it is science fiction—itself a dialectic between 
deflationary scientific cognition and unbound inflationary 
estrangement—that produces our best cognitive maps of potential 
futures.44  
Of course inflation and deflation function as a dialectic—we find echoes 
of each in the other.  The cold calculus of deflation is predicated on a 
baseline moral recognition that the injustices that are being described 
should not exist; and the soaring heights of inflation can only surpass 
mere wishful thinking when they arise out of a scientific understanding 
of capitalist reality as it now does.  
Ecocritique, like science fiction, and like the Marxist project as a 
whole, necessarily operates requires both deflation and inflation to 
stay vital, which is why the impulse towards the deflationary naming of 
various ecological catastrophes, in which terrifying scenarios draw 
attention to the consequences of inaction, must be matched by an 
inflationary, futurological impulse towards a better world for all of us— 
a transformative futurology that will always be, in some way or 
another, a science fiction. In that vein I want to conclude with the 
concept science fiction writer Kim Stanley Robinson has borrowed from 
Australian agriculturists Bill Mollison and David Holmgren and put to 
work in his novels: permaculture, which describes self-renewing 
agricultural practices that (unlike the ones Justus von Liebig both 
studied and developed) can be sustained indefinitely.  
In an interview with the website BLDBLOG, Robinson points out that 
permaculture “suggests a certain kind of obvious human goal, which is 
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that future generations will have at least as good a place to live as 
what we have now.”45 In that same interview he suggests 
permaculture as an alternative twenty first century name for  utopia. 
But this principle does not mean that permaculture must be defined by 
the penury of too-limited resources. Permaculture rejects the 
neoMalthusian logic of resource scarcity and the oxymoronic paradigm 
of “sustainable growth” in favor of what it is essentially raw futurity, a 
politico-ethical imperative not only that there should be a future but 
that the people in it deserve a decent world in which to live.  
And the same, of course, must be said for the people of the present: 
they, too, deserve a decent world in which to live. In some sense it 
may seem perverse to worry about the future for hypothetical persons 
when there are billions for whom this promise has already been 
broken. But we need to do both; deflation without inflation is just dead 
numbers, rage without hope. Only a sense that human civilization has 
a future can motivate us to make that future real. The science-fictional 
narratives of writers like Robinson are, in my view, vital in helping us 
to imagine an ecologically engaged politics, even a science-fictional 
politics. In his first novel, The Wild Shore (1984), he imagines an 
America that has been bombed back to the Stone Age, watched from 
the coastline by a coalition of nations eager to prevent American 
reunification; decades later, a character who lived through the event 
explains the contradictions in his own memory of America, which is 
incidentally our present: “America was huge, it was a giant. It swam 
through the seas eating up all the littler countries—drinking them up 
as it went along. We were eating up the world, boy, and that’s why the 
world rose up and put an end to us. So I’m not contradicting myself. 
America was great like a whale—it was giant and majestic, but it stank 
and was a killer. Lots of fish died to make it so big. Now haven’t I 
always taught you that?”46 In another early book, Pacific Edge, 
Robinson advances what could be the sad maxim of human history: 
“Every culture is as wasteful as it can afford to be.”47 The vision of 
history that informs his novels foregrounds the destructive 
contradictions at the heart of industrial society, as he notes in an 
interview in Polygraph:  
I’ve been trying to use standard economic terms to describe the 
situation in ways capitalists might have to come to terms with and that 
might serve as entry-points to a larger discussion: that the implicit 
promise of capitalism was that a generation would work so hard in the 
working class that its children would be in the middle class, and that if 
extended this program would eventually lift everyone on Earth. But 
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now resource analysis makes it clear that for the three billion living on 
less than two dollars a day this promise can never be fulfilled, so that 
capitalism is really nothing but a big Ponzi scheme, and would be 
illegal if run in a single state or community.  
Then also, the pricing we put on things, carbon especially, does 
not include the environmental costs of making the thing, so that we 
are practicing systemic predatory dumping, and the competitors we 
are predating on are our own children and the generations to come. So 
we are predatory dumpers, out- competing non-existent people, which 
is easy enough, but they will suffer when they come into existence, 
and we are cheaters.48  
But Robinson is never as cynical as these quotes might imply: he has 
spent his career in pursuit of utopia, even residing in a utopian 
planned community in California. In his seminal Mars trilogy (1990s), 
his characters move through all the usual utopian forms. The Martian 
colonists reenact King utopus’s iconic act of closure—the digging of the 
trench that separates Utopia from the mainland—in their destruction of 
the Martian space elevator. They openly revolt against terrestrial 
control; when open resistance fails, they engage in hit-and-fade 
guerrilla tactics. They infiltrate. Some become terrorists. There is 
even, as it were, a traditional sudden apocalypse—not one but two 
Great Floods—acts of God from above and from without, which leave 
both Earth and Mars in position to be politically transformed. These, 
too, fail.  
In the end there are only two sorts of revolutions that actually work in 
the Mars trilogy. The first is the aeroforming of the settlers, Robinson’s 
analogy to terraforming, which sees settlers transformed by Mars in 
much the same way that they sought to transform it. It is the 
displacement in space that returns, at the end of a century obsessed 
with time, to provide the possibility for real human change— and it 
occurs because the remove to Mars forces us, but also allows us, to 
reconnect and re-embed ourselves in an ecology, to once again be part 
of an ecologically rational cycle. (Robinson has elsewhere called for us 
to imagine ourselves as terraforming Earth—noting that in fact we 
already are, by wrecking  
it.)49)   
Tthe second  utopian move is that other impossibility, that other thing 
besides the future that we no longer quite believe in: collective action 
in the present on behalf of the future, which is to say political agency. 
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Robinson is a believer in coalition—in the building and nurturing of 
activist networks. In the end it is the tough, almost parliamentary 
work of reaching compromises, brokering deals, and changing minds 
that allows the disastrous cycle of war and revolution to be finally 
averted, the search for (and improbable discovery of) the missing color 
that might unite Red and Green. At the end of Blue Mars the 
revolutionary break is a televised speech from a group of 
astronaut/scientists, which underscores how utopian a thinker Kim 
Stanley Robinson really is. Robinson’s politics is an ongoing praxis that 
achieves victories but is never victorious—in Pacific Edge (1988), 
Robinson defines utopia not as final, fixed fulfillment but as a process: 
“Struggle forever.”50 No one said it would be easy.  
In Polygraph 22 Michael Hardt writes that during his trip to the 
protests in Copenhagen he noticed that there’s been a significant shift 
on the left since the seminal Seattle protests ten years ago. Then, the 
slogan was “We want everything for everybody”—and you still see 
some versions of that sign. But at Copenhagen the much more 
common poster was a different slogan: “There is no Planet B.” The 
first, Hardt writes, “sounds like an absurd, reckless notion that will 
propel us further down the route of mutual destruction”; the other, he 
says, sounds like Margaret Thatcher’s infamous proclamation that 
“there is no alternative” to neoliberal capitalism.51 The slogan of 
Seattle is ambitious, inflationary, and fundamentally impossible; the 
slogan of the ecological activists is deflationary, anti-ambitious, and 
starkly realistic. I suggest that permaculture is the way to retain the 
inflationary spirit of the first while embracing the deflationary 
acknowledgment of our finitude in the second. Unlike capitalist 
futurity, which is self-defeatingly dependent on infinite  growth on a 
finite planet, permaculture does not promise an impossible 
supercsession of inevitable limits; it instead locates the promise of a 
better future within those limits. Permaculture is a mode that looks to 
ecological limit not as a state of emergency or as an impending 
disaster but as a necessary constraint, as the rules of the game we 
have all been playing all this time.   
Hardt goes on: “Indeed the struggles against neoliberalism of the past 
decades have been defined by their belief in the possibility of radical, 
seemingly limitless alternatives. In short, the World Social Forum 
motto, ‘Another world is possible,’ might translate in the context of the 
climate changes movements into something like, ‘This world is still 
possible, maybe.’”52 Invoking the concept of ecological debt—accepting 
its relentless ethical demand that debts must be paid, that thefts must  
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be made right, accepting debt and  indebtedness as part of the circuits 
of social interconnectedness and mutual dependence that make a 
permaculture—helps us strike that “maybe.” As the philosopher of 
liberation Enrique Dussel put it when he unknowingly echoed both 
Hardt and Robinson in his Twenty Theses on Politics: “The critical 
ecological principle of politics could be expressed as follows: We must 
behave in all ways such that life on planet Earth might be a perpetual 
life!”53 In this way the rational accounting of our environmental limits 
and the long-delayed accounting of our ecological debts need not 
speak to withdrawal, renunciation, or defeat; it does not speak to an 
end to progress, of either the technological or the social sort, or of 
cascading disasters too far gone to remedy. In fact, in an era of 
climate change, ocean acidification, and Peak Everything, just to begin 
to name the crises, the rational consideration of ecological limits is the 
necessary prerequisite for any progress in our time—not in despair at 
what is not possible, but in hope for what still is. In this sense when 
we begin at last to talk about ecological debt we are speaking, in the 
tradition of the best of Marxism, and the most  utopian of our science 
fictions, not of history’s end but of its true beginning.  
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